Towards an Optimal Order Planning in Global Supply Chain  by Suginouchi, Shota et al.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
2212-8271 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of 48th CIRP Conference on MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS - CIRP CMS 2015
doi: 10.1016/j.procir.2015.12.025 
 Procedia CIRP  41 ( 2016 )  526 – 531 
ScienceDirect
48th CIRP Conference on MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS - CIRP CMS 2015 
Towards an optimal order planning in global supply chain 
 Shota Suginouchia,*, Toshiya Kaiharaa, Nobutada Fujiia, Satoshi Yoshidab, Yasutaka Kogaab  
aKobe University, 1-1Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku, Kobe 657-8501, Japan 
bToshiba, 33 Shin-Ishogo-cho, Isogo-ku, Yokohama 245-0017, Japan  
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +81-78-803-6250. E-mail address: suginouchi@kaede.cs.kobe-u.ac.jp 
Abstract 
This paper presents the optimal order planning and parts inventory allocation method which imitates multiple negotiation among 
various parties with combinatorial auction. Each company which constitutes the supply chain estimates the satisfaction value of 
each order.  Proposal method decides an order planning to aim maximizing an average of each company’s satisfaction value. The 
method mimics that each company negotiates with others by using combinatorial auction. A numerical example is then discussed 
to demonstrate its suitability in obtaining an optimal order under multiple negotiations with participating companies. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
In the response of increased manufacturing production lead 
time and changing market trend as well as fluctuation of 
customer demands, the parts procurement and production 
planning which based on uncertain demand forecast, have 
increasingly become difficult. As an initial report, this paper 
focuses on parts inventory allocation under demand forecast’s 
error. 
Although there is an increasing number of existing research 
literatures that emphasized on supply chain negotiation for an 
optimal ordering plan, the quantitative approaches are still 
lacking in resolving demand forecast’s errors within a situation 
of the multiple negotiations. Therefore, the appropriate order 
planning for multiple negotiations in global supply chain is 
required for maximizing gross profits in every participating 
company, which includes the sales subsidiaries, priority of 
customers, and manufacturer’s inventory stocks. This study 
also presents the developed optimization approach using 
combinatorial auctions for modelling multiple negotiations 
among all participating companies towards an optimal order 
planning[1]. 
In short, the primary scope of this developed model is to 
achieve an optimal order planning within multiple negotiations, 
which is to meet the best fulfilment of the demand orders for 
each participating company within global supply chain 
network. 
2. Model formulation 
2.1. Model 
The model formulation focuses an analysis of multiple 
negotiations in global supply chain, in which each entity 
consists of multiple sellers, a manufacturer, a Procurement and 
Sales Management (PSM) department, and a headquarter. The 
headquarter hosts auction. The criteria for the participating are 
as follows: 
Seller : It aims to maximize revenue and satisfy prioritized 
condition which is varied by various customers. 
PSM : It aims to maximize benefits. 
Manufacturer : It aims to minimize inventory assets. 
Based on the above criteria, an optimal order plan under 
multiple negotiation is established by each participating 
company. In addition, the study also aims to maximize best 
fulfilment of its order planning in every participating company. 
The included information of orders are as follows: 
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Fig. 1 An example of BOM 
x Cusomer name 
x Seller name 
x Product name 
x Order quantity 
x Sales price per lot 
x Profit per lot 
 
Each product has a Bill Of Material (BOM) as shown in 
Fig. 1.  In the case of Fig. 1, a product requires a part of each 
part category and manufacturing capacity of a unit.  
Production equipment required to manufacture varies by 
product category. The part required to manufacture the product 
and the category that the product belongs is predefined. 
Manufacturing capacity (maximum hours of use for each 
equipment) has an upper limit. 
2.2. Combinatorial auction 
The combinatorial auction[1] is known as social contract 
based approach. For model development, one of the 
participating companies is the headquarter, which plays role as 
an auctioneer, and seller, PSM, and manufacturer are then 
assigned as the bidders, and orders are classified as the assets 
for the combinatorial auction. Orders which are included in 
winning bids, are allocated to the parts inventories. The 
headquarter is required to establish the auction’s limitation, 
which includes the number of the bids per bidder for obtaining 
an efficient and feasible solution, which usually known as local 
optimum solution [2][3]. If the combination of the order is the 
winner bid of the previous auction, a bidder who made the bid 
makes bid the same combination of the orders. 
The algorithm is shown as follows: 
STEP1 Initially set l=1. Headquarter sets the number of 
iteration as L. Headquarter shows the information of 
orders for bidder. 
STEP2 Seller, PSM, and manufacturer make bids (bid 
determination problem). 
STEP3 Headquarter decides winner bids which makes 
objective function maximum (winner determination 
problem). 
STEP4   If l=L, then finish. Otherwise, l=l+1 and return to 
STEP2. 
2.3. Notation 
The notations used in this model are shown as follows: 
b : Bidder(b=1... B) 
k : Bid number(k=1…௕) 
i : Seller number(i=1…I) 
j : Order number(j=1… ௜) 
ܵܵ௞ : Seller’s satisfaction value of bidder b’s bid k 
ܲܵ௞  : PSM’s satisfaction value of bidder b’s bid k 
ܯܵ௞ : Manufacturer’s satisfaction value b’s bid k 
ܵ ௜ܲǡ௝ : Sales of seller i’s order j 
ܥ ௜ܲǡ௝  : Customer priority of customer which orders seller  
i’s order j 
ܩܯ௜ǡ௝ : The benefit gained from seller i’s order j 
ܲ ௣ܲ : Needed cost to buy a parts p 
ݕ௜ǡ௝ǡ௣ : Needed number of a part p to manufacture order j by  
seller i 
௣ܻ : Number of parts p inventory 
ܲܥ௩  : Limit of manufacturer’s productive capacity to a 
manufacture variety v 
݉௜ǡ௝ǡ௩  : Needed a variety v’s productive capacity to 
manufacture order j by seller i 
ܥ௜ǡ௠௜௡  : A minimum rate to be guaranteed, of a seller i’s sales 
price to a total of all seller’s sales price 
ܥ௜ǡ௠௔௫  : A maximum rate to be guaranteed, of a seller i’s 
sales price to a total of all seller’s sales price 
ܮ௜ǡ௝ : The maximum number of lots of order j by seller i 
ݔ௜ǡ௝ǡ௕ǡ௞ : Number of lots of order j by seller i, which included 
by bidder b’s bid k 
ܤܵ௕ǡ௞ : Bid value by bidder b’s bid k 
ܾ݅݀௕ǡ௞ : Decision variable in bidder b’s bid k 
2.4. Satisfaction values 
Equation (1), (2) and (3) are classified as the satisfaction of 
the seller, PSM and manufacturer with order j by seller i.  
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2.5. Bid determination problem 
2.5.1. Bid values 
 
Equation (4) is bid value ୠǡ୩  by bidder b’s bid k. It is 
averaging from all bidder’s satisfaction. Equations (5), (6) and 
(7) are classified as the satisfaction of the seller, PSM and 
manufacturer with bidder b’s bid k. 
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2.5.2. Bid constraints 
 
Each bidder must not make bid under infeasible 
combination.  Therefore bidding rules in conjunction with bid 
are set as shown in equations (8), (9) and (10). 
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Equation (8) is the inventory upper bound. Equation (9) is 
the productive upper bound. Equation (10) is lots upper bound.  
2.6. Making bids 
Each bidder makes bids by negotiating and cooperating with 
to other companies, to meet the best fulfilment solution. 
The algorithm is shown as follows: 
STEP1 If number of auction iteration is 1, go to STEP2-1. 
Otherwise, go to STEP2-2. 
STEP2-1 The bidder b makes first bid in accordance with 
2.6.1. 
STEP2-2 If this bid won in the previous auction, go to 
STEP3-1. If this bid lost in the previous auction, go to 
STEP3-2. 
STEP3-1 The bidder b makes bid which is same 
combination to prevent a change for worse. 
STEP3-2 The bidder chooses a company which is named 
chooser from seller, PSM and manufacturer.  
STEP4 The chooser makes neighborhood of the bidder b’s 
bid which won in the previous auction in accordance 
with 2.6.2.. The bidder bids the neighborhood. The 
bidder makes a solution improve by negotiating and 
cooperating with other companies. 
2.6.1.  Initial bid 
 
On winner determination problem discussed in detail in 
section 3.7., a ratio of sales must be considered.  If each bidders 
don’t consider other bidder’s bids, sometimes feasible solution 
is not obtained. Therefore on 1st time of auction, all bidder 
make a bid which is the same combination of orders by 
referring initial solution obtained by greedy algorithm. 
2.6.2. Remaking bid by loser  
 
Each bidder chooses one rule among the following three 
rules. Adding and removing don’t use roulette selection to 
choose an order. They narrow down orders considered effective 
to improve solution.  
 
It can be construed that narrowing is more effective than 
roulette selection to escape localized solution. It is difficult for 
a rule based approach to find a compromise position for all  
participating companies. 
Combinatorial auction with bids made by rule based 
approach, can obtain a solution which is a trade-off position for 
all participating companies. 
2.6.2.1.  Adding order 
 
The chooser adds an order which were not still included in 
the bid. Number of added lots is determined randomly within 
constrain equation (10). The chooser narrows down the fine 
orders which is candidate to add. The chooser selects an order 
randomly among the narrowed orders and adds it.   If adding 
the chosen order makes the bid infeasible, the chooser  
re-selects an order. If the bidder and chooser are same 
participating company, the bidder aims increasing its 
satisfaction. Otherwise the bidder aims a flexible attitude in 
order to win. 
2.6.2.2. Removing order 
 
The bidder removes an order which were included in the 
winner bid. Number of removed lots is determined randomly 
within range of number of lots added in the bid. The chooser 
narrows down the unfavorable orders which is candidate to 
remove. The chooser selects an order randomly among the 
narrowed orders and removes it. The bidder aims an improving 
overall of satisfaction among all companies by making a 
compromise.   
 
2.6.2.3. Swapping order 
 
The bidder adds and removes an order. The method portrays 
that the bidder makes a larger compromise than only adding or 
removing. The bidder expects that negotiation becomes active 
and to escape localized solution. 
2.7. Winner determination problem  
Objective function and constraints are as follows: 
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The decision variable is ܾ݅݀௕ǡ௞. If this value is 1, the bid 
bearing bidding number k of bidder b becomes the winner. If 0, 
the same becomes the loser. 
Objective function is expressed by equation (11), which is 
intended for maximizing the average of each bidder’s 
satisfaction.  
Equation (12) is constraint equation related to the inventory 
upper bound.  
Equations (13) and (14) guarantee a ratio of sales. A rate of 
seller i’s sales price to a total of all seller’s sales price have to 
be from ܥ௜ᇲǡ௠௜௡ to ܥ௜ᇲǡ௠௔௫.  
Equation (15) is productive capacity upper bound relates to 
product varieties. 
Equation (16) is lot quantity upper bound. 
Equation (17) guarantees that a bid becomes winner to each 
bidder.  
3. Computational experiments 
3.1. Experimental conditions 
In the numerical example, the experiment conditions are 
listed as follows: 
 
x Number of orders : 400 
x Number of lots : 5 ~ 4000 
x Number of product varieties : 179 
x Number of parts classified as part category 1 : 72 
x Number of parts classified as part category 2 : 139  
x Number of inventory quantities of each part : the lack 
of parts to manufacture all order by 1~30[%]. 
x Number of sellers I : 7 
x The lower limit of rate of a seller i’s sales price ܥ௜ǡ௠௜௡  : 
0.01 
x The higher limit of rate of a seller i’s sales price ܥ௜ǡ௠௔௫ : 
0.50 
x Customer priority ௜ǡ௝: very high (5), high (4), standard 
(3), low (2), very low(1)   
x Number of iteration L : 750 
x Number of trials : 100 
3.2. Evaluation criteria 
The criteria of the computation experiments are as follows: 
x BS : The average satisfaction of seller, PSM, and 
manufacturer 
x SS : Seller’s satisfaction 
x PS : PSM’s satisfaction 
x MS : Manufacturer’s satisfaction 
x CT :  Calculation times[s] 
This study uses CPLEX 12.6[4] to solve bid determination 
problem and exact solution, and Inter Core i5-3330S 8GB 
memory computer. 
 
Table 1. Correlation coefficients 
 Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3 
ܵ ௜ܸǡ௝ǡ ܲ ௜ܸǡ௝  -0.477 -0.060 0.974 
ܵ ௜ܸǡ௝ǡ ܯ ௜ܸǡ௝  0.620 0.026 -0.006 
ܲ ௜ܸǡ௝ǡ ܯ ௜ܸǡ௝  -0.314 0.093 -0.004 
 
Table 2. Exact solutions 
 Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3 
BS 13165.4 12467.0 10685.4 
SS 14046.2 10157.4 9587.6 
PS 13948.8 15742.4 10967.5 
MS 11501.2 11501.2 11501.2 
CT 0.3 0.4 0.4 
 
Proposal method is applied for three datasets. Dataset 1 is 
actual data. Dataset 2 and 3 are hypothetical orders which 
supposes special situation. Table 1 shows correlation 
coefficients. 
In a dataset 1, seller’s and manufacturer’s satisfaction are 
related to positive correlation. Remaining relationships are 
negative correlation. 
In a dataset 2, those satisfactions are uncorrelated. In 
dataset 3, seller’s satisfaction and PSM’s satisfactions are 
related to positive correlation. Remaining relationships are 
uncorrelated. 
Table 2 shows the exact solutions under the three datasets 
and the experimental conditions described in 3.1.. 
 
3.3. Experiment 
Each bidder makes bid by using the algorithm shown in Fig. 
2 and Fig. 3.  
Adding conditions 1~5 and removing conditions 1~3 are 
shown as follows: 
A1 : An order received by seller i satisfies equation (18).  (A 
bidder b’s bid k is a winner bid in the previous auction) 
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A2 : Some lots of the order can be manufactured by using 
only excess parts and manufacturing capacity in 
previous auction. 
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Fig. 2 Flowchart for choosing an added order 
 
A3 :  Number of lots the order included by winner bid in the 
previous auction is less than the maximum number of  
lots ௜ǡ௝ 
A4 : Number of lots of the order chosen by winner is more 
than ௜ǡ௝Ȁʹ. 
A5 : The order’s satisfaction is better than  the average. 
R1 : An order received by seller i satisfies equation (19).  
(This bid is bidder b’s bid k) 
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R2 : Number of lots of the order chosen by winner is less 
than ௜ǡ௝Ȁʹ. 
R3 : The order’s satisfaction is worse than the average. 
The algorithm’s structure and conditions are determined by 
results of preliminary experiment. 
Table 3 shows the results obtained from simulated 
experimental works.  
 
 
Fig. 3 Flowchart for choosing a removed order 
 
Fig. 4 Improvement of satisfaction value 
 
In three datasets, BS are 98.8%, 96.8%, 97.2% of the optimum 
solution on average 100 trials. Fig. 4 illustrates the improved 
satisfaction by applying a proposed method to dataset1 with 
objective function used and each bidder’s satisfaction is based 
on iteration of auctions at one trial run, which is selected 
randomly. Satisfaction value improved until about 500th time 
of auction. Proposal method can escape from localized solution 
by continuing negotiation.  
 
 
Table 3. Results using proposal method 
 Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3 
 Ave. S.D. Ave. S.D. Ave. S.D. 
BS 13005.9 27.1 12065.0 55.5 10391.0 60.3 
SS 14045.3 64.1 9847.4 164.3 9178.0 88.3 
PS 13503.9 92.5 14895.4 199.3 10568.5 109.4 
MS 11468.4 5.4 11452.1 31.5 11426.6 46.2 
CT 95.0 2.9 81.4 2.0 82.3 2.3 
 
A substantial improvement occurred at 130th-150th 
iterations of the auction on other trials.  This is caused by an 
overlap of included order by plural bidders. Both of bids 
sometimes cannot become winner because there is a constraint 
equation (16). After all of the orders that satisfaction value are 
high levels by all bidder, was included in winner, bids make 
diverse. As a result the solution improves substantially.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper examined an optimal order planning under 
multiple negotiations for global supply chain management. We 
proposed parts inventory allocation method using a 
combinatorial auction. Especially, we focused on the bid 
determination problem. The bidding rule was developed to 
obtain an optimal order planning under multiple negotiations.  
The experiments confirmed that the objective function’s 
gaps exact solutions to a proposal method, were less than 4% 
under 3 datasets which have different characters. 
 This paper only presented parts inventory allocation 
method. The next step of this research is to develop a method 
integrating parts inventory allocation and scheduling. 
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